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After eight books and numerous articles, Professor Warren F. Kimball of 
Rutgers University is widely recognized as one of the most prominent 
historians in the field of American foreign policy and diplomacy. His 
special field of interest has been Franklin D. Roosevelt and the American 
participation in World War 11, and his recent work includes The Juggler: 
Franklin Roosevelt as Wartime Statesman (New York: Princeton 
University Press, 1991), "The United States: Democratic Diplomacy," 
with Lloyd C. Gardner in D. Reynolds, W. F. &mball& A. 0. Chubarian 
(eds.), Allies at War (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), and Forged in 
War: Roosevelt, Churchill and the Second World War (New York: Wm. 
Morrow, 1997). Apart from his own research and lecturing, both at 
Rutgers and abroad as a Senior Fulbright Lecturer, Warren F. Kimball has 
\ contributed to the study of American foreign relations in several ways. 
He has been president of the Society for Historians of American Foreign 
Relations, and for six years he chaired the State Department Advisory 
Committee on Historical Documentation. 
In the Spring of 1997, while Professor Kimball was Senior Mellon 
Research Fellow at the University of Cambridge, he visited Denmark and 
gave a number of lectures at various universities and institutions. Dale 
1 Interview conducted 16 June, 1997 
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Carter suggested an interview for American Studies in Scandinavia, and 
luclcily, Professor Kimball was open to persuasion. This resulted in a talk 
in June that would take us in several different directions: from 
deliberations on the very nature of American foreign policy and the 
conditions under which it is being shaped to the present situation and the 
foreign policy of the Cliiitoii-administration; from Professor Kimball's 
own research to the opening of Soviet archives and the current 
historiographic battle over the meaning of the Cold War. 
Tlzroughout a great deal of its history, the United States has enjoyed what 
C. Vann Woodward has called yree security."Now after the end of the 
Cold Wac is that once again the case, or do you see any potential threats 
to the national sec~irity? 
Well, first of all I would gently disagree with Woodward in the sense that 
while Americans might have enjoyed,so-called "free security," that was 
not their perception. It usually refers to the nineteenth century ... and in 
fact, Americans were scared to death of the British during most of that 
century, and particularly concerned about the Spanish for a reasonable 
part. However, today threats to security come in various forms, and I 
think Vann Woodward's formulation related largely to power politics and 
the threat of military intervention. That is obviously not an immediate 
threat today, even if some people worry about North Korea, the atomic 
bomb and the longterm threats from China, but there are other threats 
related to the economic and social situation which I think are much more 
important, and sure, there are threats to the American national security in 
those terms. 
It is a common theme in the writings on American foreign policy to 
present it as an ongoing conflict between Wilsonian idealism on the one 
side, and Rooseveltian balance-of-power realism on the other side. Do 
you see this conflict as a basic tension? 
Well, it is certainly auseful way to teach students about some of the inclina- 
tions that Americans have, although I should point out that I don't think it is 
exclusive to Americans. There is a great deal of idealism and a great deal of 
so-called realism in European, Asian and anybody's foreign policy. I think 
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to present those as sort of manichean good and evil, or as extremes, is not 
terribly useful. As a teaching device it's safer, but it's not useful in analysis. 
I mean, the notion that Woodrow Wilson was not realistic is sort of silly. If 
realism is, in the way that most people define it, the application of power to 
defend the interests of the state ... my goodness, Woodrow Wilson inter- 
vened militarily more times than any other president in the history of the 
nation. So, the dichotomy just doesn't work that well ... 
But isn't it fair to say that American politicians are expected to laminate 
foreign policy with a coating of moralism in order to generate public 
support; that there is a propensity in the political culture which makes it 
somewhat different from the tradition of foreign policy-making in many 
European countries? 
Yes, I think that is true, except I am not sure that I'm comfortable with 
the implied pejorative that goes in there about "laminating" it with 
moralism. Nations have a sense of what's ethical. I don't like the word 
"moral," because that brings theology into the question, and I don't want 
to get into a theological argument here, but societies have a sense of 
what's ethical, and I think most societies try to follow their own ethics. In 
some cases - and this is true particularly for Europe, although not 
exclusively - where you have a long tradition for aristocratic control over 
foreign policy, I think you might be able to argue pretty successfully that 
the ethical standards applied by the aristocracy, or this residue of the 
aristocracy, might be quite different from the kind of standards that are 
expected by the American public of its leaders. 
' That leads me to the issue of how foreign policy is shaped in the United 
States, and by whom. Is it largely the work of an elite? 
Well, the word "elite" requires some definition. Making foreign policy in 
the United States is done largely by a group of people whose political 
views and party [preference], Democratic vs. Republican, are less 
important than their connections with universities and big business ... the 
powerful elements in the American educational, business and banking 
communities. I think those people have the greatest influence on 
American foreign policy as a group. Now, that said, it is not exclusive 
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power. You can look at lists of various important figures in government, 
or in various think tanks that are around Washington, and they are not all 
from the Ivy League, and they are not all reflecting business and banking 
interests, but I think those interests are the strongest in malting foreign 
policy. That said, American foreign policy does have to operate within 
certain parameters, and they are fairly strict parameters, imposed by these 
elements of culture and public attitudes - domestic constraints. 
Could you argue that the Cold War-paradigm posed fewer domestic 
constraints on this elite than is the situation today? 
Well, I wouldn't say fewer constraints. In fact, in some ways it posed 
even greater constraints, since the government was expected to fight the 
Cold War. The government was expected to confront the Soviet Union 
and prevent Soviet expansion, so I mean those are pretty strong con- 
straints ... But what you are really saying is that when there is no single 
enemy ... It is always a little bit more tricky, I guess, to conduct foreign 
policy when there is less sense of crisis. On the other hand, domestic 
constraints, I think, diminish in a time of less crisis. Granted, the 
Congress can have a bit more influence over petty issues when there is no 
crisis ... On the other hand, the level of public interest in foreign policy 
diminishes when crises are less, and I am quite convinced that Congress 
reflects public attitudes, albeit indirectly and imprecisely . . . 
But isn't there a paradox here? On the one hand, the public might be even 
less interested now in foreign policy. On the other hand they might have a 
larger say, since the foreign policy elite to a greater extent than 
previously will have to enter the marketplace of ideas and "sell" every 
proposal in a way that they did not have to during the Cold War.? 
Perhaps. It depends on the issue and the circumstances. It looks as if 
NATO expansion, for example, is probably going to go through, but it 
also looks as if the desire to keep the costs down is one of the reasons 
why the Clinton-administration limited it to three countries instead of 
five, as some of the European countries want. So that is perhaps an 
example of the fact that you have not so much a paradox, but different 
influences pulling in different directions.. . 
It has been argued that American foreign policy has become more 
impulsive, as the media are moving their attention from one crisis some- 
where in the third world to another one elsewhere. Does it make for a 
more emotionally-driven foreign policy, often triggered by media 
coverage of various conflicts around the globe? 
I am not sure that it is more emotional than it has ever been. It has always 
been incredibly emotional, but what you do have now is a different style 
of media attention because of instant communications. We can bounce 
from one crisis to another in the space of a heartbeat. In that sense it is 
much more tricky to conduct foreign policy - in all the nations in the 
world, not just the United States ... The United States State Department, 
for goodness sake, in every office I have ever been in has CNN going on 
24 hours a day, or whenever there is someone in the office. Because the 
State Department, I think, lives in constant fear that CNN is going to 
know something before they do. That's really true, I am not exaggerating. 
I don't think there is anything wrong with that by the way, I think that's 
good! 
But do you think it affects priorities in foreign policy? 
Sure, it is going to affect priorities, but priorities were affected by what 
we would call media attention even before. In fact, maybe better media 
attention would have made for better foreign policy. American entry into 
World War I and World War I1 were highly affected by media attention, 
but the time-lag was more than it is today. The notion that somehow 
media and the various things that affect public opinion did not play a role 
before, I don't think it is correct. 
But I guess you could argue that CNN and other TV-channels have the 
ability to report events from remote places that would otherwise be 
outside the American public's attention? 
Well, maybe so. But you know, there was a lot of public sentiment back 
in the early twentieth century for the United States to intervene during the 
Armenian-Turkish conflict. When there was a massive pogrom in czarist 
Russia, there was a good deal of media attention, although nothing came 
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of these things ... Armenia and pogroms in Russia were certainly third- 
world issues for the United States at the turn of the century, so we've 
been involved in such issues before. Sure, you have much more of it 
beating on you [now]. Maybe so much so that Americans don't pay much 
attention to it. I saw it argued the other day that the intervention in 
Somalia was an example of Americans mobilized by the tragedy that was 
unveiled before them on public television. Where is that cry for 
mobilization now, the public support for some kind of action to help the . 
ref~lgees down in the Congo? ... I mean, there is no outcry at all. Once 
you have gone b o u g h  your quota of starving refugees, you are sort of 
inoculated and become a bit cynical. In fact, maybe the answer is you 
realize that we can't, the United States doesn't have the physical 
capability, regardless of the inclination, to solve these problems. It can't 
be done. 
Let's tuvn our attention to the foreign policy of the Clinton-administra- 
tion. Some have descvibed it as rudderless. Do you share this view? 
No, I would certainly say that about domestic policy without hesitation, 
but I am not sure "rudderless" is quite the way I would characterize the ad- 
ministration's foreign policy, although I am not sure exactly what a more 
positive way to do it would be. I seems to me that the Clinton-administra- 
tion has been trying to react to world situations in a reasonably consistent 
manner, whether I like it or not. We have taken a pretty clear position for 
example on NATO enlargement. I don't agree with it, but I think it is a 
pretty clear position, one that some of the European NATO members 
are not happy with. We have taken a pretty clear position on trade and 
relationships with China, and we have taken a pretty clear position, I think, 
on trying to act as a mediator in the Middle East conflict. So those are the 
three biggest foreign policy issues that come to mind, and I think in each 
of those three cases the United States has been pretty consistent. 
You mentioned that you disagree with the NATO enlargement. 
Yes, I simply dislike immensely expanding military alliances. Every time 
someone tries to reassure me that it is not a military alliance, but kind of 
a cultural, geographic, political relationship, I am pulled back to reality 
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when I see public statements by American leaders saying for example 
that Slovenia is not militarily prepared to join NATO. Well, then 
obviously we are talking military. I do not see military alliances as the 
best preservers of peace and the best promoters of good relationships. 
Personally, I think that NATO should simply have been dissolved once 
the Soviet Union collapsed. If you want to create political and economic 
relationships, you should start from a clean slate. Well, I understand why 
they didn't do it. Chances are you couldn't even get anything started 
without having to build on the corpse of NATO. There is also an 
understandable concern on the part of some of the policy-malting 
elements in Europe ... that if we don't expand NATO, the United States 
will somehow pull out of Europe. But I don't thinlt that it's handled well, 
and I don't thinlt we should play on the intense, historically justified, b~l t  
highly emotional fears of Eastern Europe with regard to Russia, and 
that's what NATO enlargement is doing. 
Would you care to comment on the appointment of Madeleine Albright as 
Secretary of State. Does it make any difference for the sense ojdirection 
in the Clinton-administration, or are the personal characteristics of key 
diplomatic players of little relevance here? 
No, personalities always play a role in history, even if great forces 
sometimes overwhelm them. Madeleine Albright gives the appearance of 
a great deal more decisiveness, although if you knew Warren Cristopher 
privately, I think you would find that he was a very firm man and a very 
tough cookie, but his public style was quite different from hers. So she 
gives the appearance of consistency, but as I told you before, I don't think 
' policy has been inconsistent under the Clinton-administration, whether I 
like it or not. I see no evidence today that Madeleine Albright has made 
any major changes or contemplates making any major changes. The one 
good thing that may come out of her appointment is that she seems to be 
able to negotiate a bit more effectively with Senator Jesse Helms. 
Do you see President Clinton S foreign policy as an attempt to (re)create 
a bipartisan consensus? 
Sure. Clinton by definition wants to be loved, he doesn't want to fight 
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with people, he wants admiration, he wants consensus ... Every president 
would love to have a bipartisan everything so long as the president 
generally speaking wins most of the arguments ... In a lot of ways Amer- 
ican foreign policy operates from a reinarltably consistent consensus in 
the society. The argument over foreign policy is rarely over strategy, it is 
usually over tactics. I am not at all sure I could point to any issue today 
where Clinton and the Republicans differ on strategy. I do think I could 
point to some issues where they disagree on tactics, for example China. 
The Republicans and the Democrats agree that: 1) We don't want. to 
alienate China and create an enemy. 2) Trade with China is of great value 
to everybody in the United States. 3) We don't like the human rights 
violations that China commits, primarily against its own people. 4) We 
worry steadily about the fact that maybe China has expansionist views in 
East Asia ... I think both Republicans and Democrats agree, and I can't 
think of another major element in China policy that they would throw out 
there, but they do argue over how to achieve the goals. 
I would like now to turn your attention to the craft of writing history, and 
begin by asking you about your own work. You have published numerous 
books and articles concerning wartime America and the foreign policy of 
the Roosevelt-administration, and a couple of months ago your latest 
book Forged in War; Roosevelt, Churchill and the Second World War 
was published. Could you tell us about the book and the research it 
required? 
The book really is the culmination of a research interest that began in the 
early 1960s when I was a doctoral candidate, and it is without shame or 
apology a study of foreign policy from the top. It is by no means intended 
to be the last word, because there is a great deal more to American 
foreign policy and diplomacy than just the top, but this is an attempt to 
look at it from the viewpoint of the two leaders, whom I have been 
studying for over thirty years. An attempt to craw1 into their minds and 
explain their true motivation, I hope, in doing the things that they did. So 
in some ways the book is a synthesis of thirty-five years of work. That 
doesn't mean that there isn't some new material in it, there really is, 
because one of the interesting things I find is that every time I look at 
some of these important archives, I see things I missed on the earlier trip, 
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or I suddenly realize that perhaps there is another way to look at a 
document. So, it has that kind of research in it, and I try my best to make 
it both archival based and sensitive to the latest secondary work that has 
been published. 
You have personally been involved in the declassification of American 
documents from the Cold War era, and the Russians as well have 
gradually begun to open the Soviet archives for both domestic and 
foreign researchers. Some of these newly available sources have already 
made it necessary to rewrite the history of major incidents like the Cuban 
Missile Crisis. Do you find it likely that the archives still hold major 
surprises for the historians - surprises that may lead to major 
reassessments of U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War? 
I don't think we will have a major reassessment of American foreign 
policy, but I think we are probably going to have to reassess Soviet 
foreign policy pretty significantly, and I have no idea about smaller 
country foreign policies. For example, who knows what the French were 
really thinking and doing. I don't know where they are in opening their 
archives. So, I think the opening of archives invariably helps us to 
understand things better, but let me address this a little more fully. First of 
all, interpretation is where we end up once the facts are laid out, where 
we end up in the history of any foreign policy, in the history of 
international relations. We end up using context and detail to help us to 
better understand the motivation, the purposes, the factors that created a 
nation's foreign policy. We can tell what the foreign policy is, you can 
read the public statements that any foreign ministry makes, but that 
doesn't explain motivation, it doesn't really lay out long-term goals. We 
find that only by studying the context, so as the archives open we 
constantly learn more about context. 
Let me give you an example that is going on today in the history of 
foreign policy, and one that I think is wrongheaded, but it is interesting. 
There is a new thesis, which is probably captured most strongly by John 
Gaddis' new book, (We Now Know: Washington; Council on Foreign 
Relations, 1997) although he is certainly not the lone ranger here. It is 
essentially argued, as a lot of East-Europeans have been arguing for a 
while, that the Cold War was the creation of Joseph Stalin, period, end of 
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discussion. Everything else is sort of a function of Stalin's behavior. Now 
that is the first point. The second point is that the ass~lmption is that Stalin 
combines all sorts of different motivations - marxist romanticism is one 
- but that wrapped up with it always is the desire for expansion of the 
Soviet Union. That is a very interesting assertion for which there is no 
evidence, beca~lse we haven't gotten into the Soviet archives. The 
assumption in your first question was wrong, we have not gotten into 
Soviet archives. What has happened is that bits and pieces from Soviet 
archives have been made available to people, but historians cannot 
develop the sense of context until they have true access to the archival 
record, because what I think is important to understand context may not 
be what you think is important. So I have no faith whatsoever in dramatic 
new interpretations of American policy, or more important, how the 
Soviet Union reacted to American policy. I have no faith in recent 
interpretations of that when someone says these are based upon the latest 
new findings in Soviet archives, because I know that those findings are 
dramatically limited. 
Another part of the story that might be worth mentioning is that for ten 
years I headed up the American side of a Soviet-American-, and later 
Soviet-British-American project on the history of the Second World War. 
For seven of those years we were told repeatedly by Russian historians 
(then Soviet historians) that there were no archives that held any records 
of Stalin-memoranda, or papers presented to Stalin - things that would 
help us to understand the options that were presented to Stalin and 
perhaps how he chose them, and perhaps let us understand a little better 
why he chose them. I mean, does he have world domination in mind or a 
defensive empire? From 1985 until the early 1990s we were told there 
were no such records, and then General Volkogonoff came out with his 
biography of Stalin (Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy New York: Grove 
Weidenfeld 1991). Now, whatever you think of that biography, it 
certainly demonstrated beyond doubt that there were what we generally 
call presidential archives that have just that kind of information. The one 
thing I am reasonably confident of is that we have not seen the important 
materials or anything resembling all the important materials that are 
available in the Soviet archives, much less French archives and the 
archives from a half dozen other somewhat smaller nations. 
You have on several occasions engaged yourself in historiographic 
battles. To mention one example, you once criticized tlze dominance of 
post-revisionism, and argued that its view of the Cold War could largely 
be defined as "orthocloxy plus archives." Is that still how you see it? 
Well, I think I do largely see it that way. I think that there are some boolts 
that are imaginative and help us to better understand the Cold War. 
Melvin Leffler's A Preponderance of Power (check) is a classical ex- 
ample, but I am disturbed that we now have begun to see the emergence 
of a thesis that in essence proclaims "the end of Cold War history." That 
is to say, if we know that the Cold War was caused by Josef Stalin, 
period, then why bother even going to the archives anymore? It makes no 
sense, right? History is over. We got the answers, let's get on to other 
things. And I think that is a curiously anti-intellectual, ahistorical point of 
view, which in the case of some of the East Europeans, who have suffered 
through the brutality of Soviet domination, is quite understandable ... But 
intellectually I find that it is a pretty unsatisfying way to go with history. 
